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IDENTIFYING PRIVACY: AN INTRODUCTION
Joshua Herman*

The 2004 DePaul Law Review Symposium set out to answer a seemingly straightforward question: How does the right to privacy affect
who we are? The answers provided by the symposium participants
illustrate the true complexity of that question. Perhaps even more important than the participants' answers were their approaches to addressing that question. Those varied approaches engaged distinct
facets of the right to privacy, and the speakers each adopted unique
angles when they considered how privacy impacts our lives. The approaches were diverse, not divergent, and they imbued the Symposium and this issue with a rich and complex texture.
Any study of the right to privacy must encompass a number of perspectives due to the complex, and even paradoxical, nature of that
right. The right to privacy has long been subject to confusion, as Edward Bloustein's comments from over forty years ago indicate: "Remarkably enough, however, there remains to this day considerable
confusion concerning the nature of the interest which the right to privacy is designed to protect."' It is a right that is not enumerated in the
2
Constitution, yet, as the familiar "penumbra theory" portrays, its fun* Law clerk to Judge James B. Moran, Northern District of Illinois; Symposium Editor,
DePaul Law Review (2003-04). Credit is due to the many individuals who helped ensure that
the 2004 DePaul Law Review Symposium: Privacy and Identity: Constructing, Maintaining, and
ProtectingPrivacy, was a fruitful event. The Symposium would not have been possible without
the participation of the excellent group of panelists. That group includes not only the authors of
the following essays, but also: Professor Andrew Koppelman, Mr. Paul Smith, Professor Mary
Becker, Dr. Amitai Etzioni, Professor Tracey Meares, and Mr. C6dric Laurant. Professor Stephen Siegel, Professor Donald Hermann, and Professor Katherine Strandburg were expert moderators. Professor Strandburg deserves special recognition for her assistance throughout the
planning and production stages of this project. Also, Professor Michele Goodwin and Professor
Stephan Landsman provided invaluable assistance. Finally, the able staff of the DePaul Law
Review was and continues to be an important source of support in shepherding this project to
fruition.
1. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 962 (1964). See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORhave defined privacy
MATION PRIVACY LAW 27 (2003) ("Over the past four decades, academics
over informacontrol
and
self,
the
to
access
limited
secrecy,
as a right of personhood, intimacy,
tion. However, defining privacy has proven to be quite complicated, and many commentators
have expressed great difficulty in defining precisely what privacy is.").
2. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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damental nature permeates that document, and affects all of our lives.
Further, while we are able to rank empirically the relative invasiveness of privacy intrusions, 3 such categorization does not universally
and permanently fix the meaning of privacy. A definition of the right
to privacy resists broad generalizations because privacy is experienced
at the most personal levels, a fact that requires an emphasis on individuals' subjective expectations of privacy. By presenting multiple
conceptions of privacy and by contextualizing privacy in a variety of
situations, the symposium participants achieved a holistic understanding of privacy.
The Symposium was structured to facilitate that understanding of
privacy. Each of the three panels explored distinct, yet interrelated
themes. For the first panel, "Privacy and Intimacy," Lawrence v.
Texas 4 served as the springboard for discussion on how the right to
privacy affects our intimate relationships. Panelists discussed spatial
privacy, in the sense that intimate conduct often occurs behind closed
doors, informational privacy with respect to the sharing and disclosing
of personal and intimate information with others, and decisional privacy, which implicates the liberty interests and autonomy issues that
were crucial factors in Lawrence. The second panel, "Privacy and
Community," focused on how community norms and expectations
often define and shape the identities of individuals who may sacrifice
privacy for acceptance within the community. For the last panel, "Privacy and Liberty," panelists considered how surveillance technologies
induce individuals to alter their behaviors and even identities. Each
panel located and considered privacy in progressively broader contexts-from an individual's relationship with another individual, to an
individual's relationship with a community, to an individual's relationship with a government. Still, despite the different contexts linking
each panel, and the Articles gathered in this issue, are the overarching
questions of how privacy, or the lack of it, affects who we are, how it
shapes and manipulates our mannerisms, and impacts our behavior.
Each Article collected in this symposium issue attempts to answer that
question in its own way. What follows is a summary of those essays
and some observations of the common threads that bind them
together.

3. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:An EmpiricalLook at "UnderstandingsRecognized
and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Professor Donald Hermann examines the cases cited in Bowers v.
Hardwick5 and contends that those cases support a right to nonprocreational, sexual intimacy between consenting adults: "The Court
consciously linked the right to choose an abortion to the liberty interest in intimate relationships, of which personal sexual intimacy must
be a quintessential interest."'6 In Lawrence, argues Professor Hermann, the Court correctly upheld that right and reversed Bowers,
which held to the contrary. In his Poe v. Ullman7 dissent, Justice John
Marshall Harlan first recognized that the right to sexual intimacy was
a protected liberty interest but he also limited that right to the context
of marital relations. 8 Professor Hermann observes that in Eisenstadt
v. Baird9 the Court severed the link between the right to sexual intimacy and the marital relationship by striking down a ban on the sale
10
of contraceptives to unmarried people as unconstitutional. But, as
Professor Hermann notes, Eisenstadt applied an equal protection and
not a due process analysis." Still, other decisions link Eisenstadt to
Griswold and extend the right to sexual intimacy from married
2
couples to consenting adults. Stanley v. Georgia' focused on spatial
privacy issues and Roe v. Wade' 3 emphasized decisional privacy issues.
Thus, decisional privacy protects the choice of consenting adults to be
sexually intimate and spatial privacy secures their right to engage in
such behavior in the privacy of their homes. Professor Hermann also
cites Carey v. Population Services International14 as further evidence
that the Court recognizes a right to engage in non-procreational, sexual activity. 15 In light of those cases, continues Professor Hermann,
the error of Bowers is apparent. Instead of speaking in terms of sexual intimacy, the Court improperly narrowed the issue to homosexual
sodomy.' 6 In contrast, in his Bowers dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun
focused on the sexual intimacy and described its role as central to the
family, community, and individual personality.1 7 That rationale domi5. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6. Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy:Sex and the Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 934 (2005).

7. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
8. Hermann, supra note 6, at 919.
9. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
10. Hermann, supra note 6, at 923-24.
11. Id. at 924.
12. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
15. Hermann, supra note 6, at 926.
16. Id. at 930.
17. Id. at 938-39.
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nated the majority opinion in Lawrence, which also highlighted the
error in Bowers's undue focus on homosexual sodomy.
After discussing cases that led to Lawrence, Professor Hermann
then turns to cases and issues that have followed in its wake. He analyzes Williams v. Pryor,18 a case that involved an Alabama statute that
regulated the sale of personal sexual devices. As Professor Hermann
describes, Williams illustrates that even after Lawrence, courts are still
unsure of the scope of protected sexual activity, and the resolution of
what is covered depends on how each court decides to construe the
issues presented. Narrowly construing the parameters of protected
sexual conduct will rarely lead to decisions that protect an individual's
course of conduct in the face of state regulations. In contrast, if courts
evaluate the issues presented broadly, and emphasize protected liberty interests without codifying and focusing on specific acts, it is
likely that they will find the conduct at issue to be protected. Thus, a
narrow construction of the disputed right, which is the act claimed to
be a protected right, will uphold a state statute regulating that right,
while a broad description of a liberty interest will protect the rights
included therein.
Professor Vincent Samar explores the debate over same-sex marriages versus civil unions that dominated the national stage not only
before Lawrence was decided, but especially after that decision was
announced. 19 After delving into that debate, Professor Samar concludes that civil unions are an inferior substitute for same-sex marriage due to three primary concerns. 20 First, he asserts, civil unions
lack the same social meaning as marriage. 21 Second, equating civil
unions and same-sex marriage ignores how society and culture impact
and regulate the development of individual identities. 22 Third, withholding the opportunity to marry from same-sex couples denies them
equality.2 3 And as a result of that disparate treatment, Professor Samar argues, the message sent to same-sex couples is that they are inferior to opposite sex couples.2 4 Thus, according to Professor Samar,
instead of extending rights, civil unions inculcate disparate treatment
18. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002): Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 949
(11th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
19. Vincent Samar, Privacy and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage Versus Unions, 54
DEPAUL L. REv. 783 (2005).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and ultimately- deny same-sex couples dignity. 25 Professor Samar also
observes that marriage confers legitimacy on couples' intimate decisions.2 6 As a corollary, a same-sex couple's intimate decisions, which
are essential to the development of an individual identity, will be
27
deemed illegitimate so long as the opportunity to marry is withheld.
Professor Samar concludes by reminding us that the debate over civil
unions versus same-sex marriage is, at its core, a debate over human
civil rights deequality, 28 and explicitly frames Lawrence as a seminal
29
Education.
of
Board
cision by linking it to Brown v.
For his contribution, 30 Professor Lior Strahilevitz focuses on Lawrence through the lens of information privacy. He considers the impact that case will have on issues involving public sex, particularly
those issues addressed in Lovisi v. Slayton.31 Drawing on a harm principle that he sees in Lawrence, Professor Strahilevitz contends that
states may regulate conduct that poses a sufficient aesthetic harm but
perceived offenses to morality, which
they can no longer regulate
32
often lack tangible harms.
25. Samar, supra note 19, at 789-90.
26. Id. at 793.
27. Just as the state's exclusion of individuals from benefits and rights that are made generally
available will negatively impact those individuals' identities, the state's selective prosecution of
those individuals will also harm their identities by criminalizing their intimate decisions. Professor Laurence Tribe makes this point in the context of anti-sodomy statutes:
Such a prohibition [of sodomy], whether or not cast in terms that expressly singled out
same-sex relationships, operated to stigmatize those relationships in particular by reducing them to a forbidden sexual act. The result was to brand as less worthy than
others those individuals who did no more than seek fulfillment as human beings by
forming voluntary intimate relationships with others of the same sex. This stigmatization locked an entire segment of the population into a subordinate status and often
forced such individuals either to transform or to suppress important dimensions of their
identities in order to escape second-class treatment in the public realm.
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its Name,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1943 (2004).

28. Samar, supra note 19, at 800, 804.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Professor Tribe also links Lawrence to Brown: "For when the history
of our times is written, Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and
lesbian America." Tribe, supra note 27, at 1895. Professor Tribe emphasizes Lawrence's focus
on dignity:
[T]he best we can do now is take the measure of Lawrence as a landmark in its own
right by placing its logic in the context of the larger project of elaborating, organizing,
and bringing to maturity the Constitution's elusive but unquestionably central protections of liberty, equality, and-underlying both-respect for human dignity.
Id.; see also id. at 1945 ("But the most distinctive facet of Lawrence is surely the decision's focus
on the right to dignity and equal respect for people involved in intimate relationships .... ").
30. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2005).

31. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
32. Strahilevitz, supra note 30, at 677.
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Professor Strahilevitz begins his analysis by highlighting the two
forms of privacy that he relies on in his essay: Informational privacy
and decisional privacy. With respect to informational privacy, Professor Strahilevitz notes that the law rarely regulates an individual's
choice to share his private information with others. 33 And as for decisional privacy, Professor Strahilevitz links it to the Due Process
34
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also the harm principle.
Then, turning to Lawrence, he explains why sex acts in the presence of
another do not qualify as public sex due to informational privacy principles, specifically those that assert that one does not waive his reasonable expectation of privacy when he shares information with others. 35
Jeffrey Rosen made a similar observation when he linked information
privacy and intimacy: "Privacy is necessary for the formation of intimate relationships, allowing us to reveal parts of ourselves to friends,
family members, and lovers that we withhold from the rest of the
world. It is, therefore, a precondition for friendship, individuality, and
even love."'36 Professor Tribe notes that human relations and interactions served a pivotal role in Lawrence when he stressed that "the
Court left no doubt that it was protecting the equal liberty not of atomistic individuals torn from their social contexts, but of people as
'37
they relate to, and interact with, one another.
Professor Strahilevitz also focuses on the fact that the sex acts in
Lawrence occurred in the privacy of a home, which invokes spatial
privacy,38 and opines that the most accurate view of spatial privacy
borrows from property law. The accepted definition of spatial privacy
divides space into a public versus private binary that does not reflect
the variety, and often hybrid nature, of public and private spaces. 39
Property law not only divides space into multiple settings, but also it
factors in our expectations of each location. Resonating those multiple settings, Professor Strahilevitz discusses the different scenarios involving public sex and concentrates on the harms, or "negative
externalities," if any, that are involved.4 0 To make the case for public
sex, Professor Strahilevitz first points to the weaknesses of existing
33. Id. at 679.
34. Id. at 680-81.
35. Id. at 682-83.
36. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 11
(2000).
37. Tribe, supra note 27, at 1898.
38. Rosen also comments on the importance of spatial privacy in intimate relationships: "Behind the protective shield of privacy, two individuals can relax the boundaries of self and lose
themselves in each other." ROSEN, supra note 36, at 215.
39. Strahilevitz, supra note 30, at 683-84.
40. Id. at 685-86.
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arguments that attempt to support such conduct, 41 and then he posits
that information privacy should protect the exchange of intimate information between three consenting adults and, therefore, public sex
is worthy of the same protection that exists when only two people are
involved. 42 For Professor Strahilevitz, consent always exists when inthat present no
formation is shared in private, and in those situations
43
external harm, state regulation is inappropriate.
Professor Linda McClain examines how individuals negotiate and
reconcile their own identity development with cultural expectations
and notions of group identity. 44 Anchoring her examination are two
films, Real Women Have Curves and Bend It Like Beckham, both of
which focus on adolescent girls coming-of-age in multicultural settings. In each film the protagonist strives to forge her individual identity and struggles to achieve autonomy, which Professor McClain
describes as relational, in that one develops autonomy in the context
of relationships. 45 The characters construct their own identities instead of obediently acquiescing to group and societal expectations and
assuming the identities those expectations ascribe for them. 46 Professor McClain asserts that privacy allows the characters to explore their
identities without succumbing to the pressures that exert force on
them and attempt to derail their identity development. 4 7 That contention echoes Rosen's comment that "[p]rivacy protects a space for negotiating legitimately different views of the good life, freeing people
from the constant burden of justifying their differences. '48 "Space"
here signifies more than physical parameters, but that connotation is
important, as seen in the films when the protagonists' mothers invade
their privacy by making critical comments about the young women's
bodies. It also signifies a mental space, in which one may imagine and
even live her version of the good life, momentarily unencumbered by
reality's attendant pressures and expectations. Significantly, both
films end with the female protagonists leaving their families and departing for universities far from their homes.49 Still, support from
other family members plays an essential role and enables each charac41. Id. at 693.
42. Id. at 694.
43. Id. at 699-700.
44. Linda C. McClain, Bend It Like Beckham and Real Women Have Curves: Constructing
Identity in Multicultural Coming-of-Age Stories, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 704-06 (2005).
45. Id. at 702-03.
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 704.
48. ROSEN, supra note 36, at 24.

49. McClain, supra note 44, at 728, 746-47.
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ter to achieve her goals and fashion her identity.5 0 Professor McClain
shows that identity development in these contexts, which implicate
universal themes, 51 is a process rife with negotiations that produce
52
true individuals, unique in every way.
In his Article 53 Professor Jonathan Kahn examines the relationship
between privacy, individual identity, and dignity and focuses on two
decisions, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 54 and Plessy v.
Ferguson.55 By considering those cases in relation to each other, Professor Kahn concludes that Plessy is, at its heart, a decision about controlling identity and, further, there is an inherent racial component in
the origins of the right to privacy. 56 Professor Kahn reminds us that
the central underlying facet of Plessy involved defamation of reputation actions, which were suits brought by whites who were treated or
identified as blacks. Thus, identity was central to Plessy and by allowing the states, through their agents (i.e., a train conductor), to determine who was white and who was black, the courts enabled the
states to control identity by defining it and conditioning benefits on
those determinations. While the physical bondage of slavery may
have lapsed, the Jim Crow era, punctuated by Plessy, produced a destructive regime that enslaved identity and dignity. 57 Viewing
Pavesich through Plessy, Professor Kahn contends that the former is
not merely a case that allowed plaintiffs to sue for unauthorized commercial appropriation of one's image; instead it enabled whites to control their identities. 58 Professor Kahn observes that Plessy created a
badge of servitude by refusing to empower blacks with control over
their identities, and Pavesich did the exact opposite for whites. 59 Yet
Plessy and Jim Crow regimes did not completely deny identity; rather,
they provided an identity that was inferior and was entitled to fewer
rights and benefits. Thus, it would seem that attention should be paid
to the link between rights and identities. In this sense, strong similarities are present between Professor Kahn's Article and those written
by Professors Hermann and Samar. In all three pieces, the authors
observe that the withholding of rights diminishes the dignity of those
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 750.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 704.
Jonathan Kahn, Controlling Identity: Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 DEPAJL

L. REv. 755 (2005).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Kahn, supra note 53, at 759.
Id. at 761, 765.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 759-60.
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who cannot realize those rights because they are not in the benefited
class. And when the state determines who is in that class, it is able to
control both identity and the rights that are conditioned upon that
identity.
Professor Christopher Slobogin focuses on another form of governmental regulation of privacy when he examines the government's use
of subpoenas to obtain personal papers.60 According to Professor
Slobogin, the problem lies in the fact that the government can obtain
"papers," including personal documents containing revealing information, without making a showing of probable cause-the burden required by the Fourth Amendment. 61 In an environment where the
government has easy access to our personal documents, very little is
exempt from the government's purview, which ultimately diminishes
freedom. 62 Professor Slobogin's account of the history of subpoenas,
and the Supreme Court's role in shaping that history, reveal that the
justifications for relaxing the government's burden originally applied
to corporate papers, but has been expanded to apply to personal papers as well. 63 Professor Slobogin is also critical of the rationales that
are offered for the relaxed burden and concludes that those reasons
fail to justify the government's ability to obtain personal records on a
64
showing of relevance.
Lee Tien is similarly concerned with the government's invasions of
privacy, but, unlike Professor Slobogin, who focused on the government's conduct, Tien evaluates the rights that individuals have to protect their privacy. 65 Tien's primary concern is the scope of the right to
take privacy precautions. 66 According to Tien, the Court recognized
the right to take privacy precautions when it linked closing the tele67
phone booth door with expecting privacy in Katz v. United States
and that we also practice this right on a daily basis, such as when we
whisper so as not to be overheard by others. Tien concludes that we
not only have the right to take privacy precautions, but also that we
have the right to expect that the government will not interfere with
60. Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805 (2005).
61. Id. at 806-08.
62. ROSEN, supra note 36, at 29 ("If private papers could be seized, and our confidential communications with others could be exposed, people would take care not to record their confidences in the first place, and friendship, intimate disclosures, and even freedom of thought
would be inhibited.").
63. Slobogin, supra note 60, at 810.
64. Id. at 829.
65. Lee Tien, Doors, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain Role of Precautionsin Fourth
Amendment Law, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 873 (2005).

66. Id. at 875-76.
67. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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those precautions. 68 Tien opines that the right to take privacy precautions is inherent in the right to privacy itself, as our expectations of
privacy often depend on what we have done to protect that privacy.69
Further, using crippled encryption and mandatory tappability as examples, Tien demonstrates that by regulating those precautions, the
government manipulates our expectations of privacy. 70 The government is thus able to shape the contours of the right to privacy by regulating privacy precautions. But we need not look to detailed
legislation that regulates complicated technologies to see Tien's point.
In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, the Court upheld
the application of a "stop and identify" statute over the petitioner's
objections based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 71 While the
majority opinion concentrated on facilitating a police investigation
and likened the factual setting to those present in vagrancy law cases,
the dissent emphasized the importance of identity. 72 Thus, by authorizing police officers to compel citizens to disclose their identities, the
Court has shaped our expectations of privacy. Tien concludes by advocating for transparency of all government regulations of privacy
precautions and further, that those regulations must represent com73
pelling interests.
While Lee Tien focuses on how individuals protect their privacy,
Professor Richard Warner analyzes situations in which individuals
have the ability to exchange their personal information for increased
market efficiency. 7 4 But Professor Warner also emphasizes that businesses that seek information from consumers must obtain consent
from those consumers prior to gathering personal data. 75 Similar to
Professor Strahilevitz's focus, Professor Warner concentrates on information privacy, and specifically, issues involving the disclosure of information and what that information says about an individual's
68. Tien, supra note 65, at 875-76, 891.
69. Id. at 877-78. This observation adds much to the perspective that our subjective expectations of privacy have decreased as surveillance technology has become more sophisticated and
prevalent. See ROSEN, supra note 36, at 60-61. That opinion is true, but it overlooks Lee Tien's
point that privacy precaution technology also has developed at a rapid pace, and continues to do
so at a speed that is perhaps on par with privacy reducing technology.
70. Tien, supra note 65, at 902-05.
71. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
72. Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent made the connection between identity and control clear
when he quoted from Terry v. Ohio: "The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the 'right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person."' Id. at 2465
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
73. Tien, supra note 65, at 906-07.
74. Richard Warner, Surveillance and the Self- Privacy, Identity, and Technology, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 847 (2005).
75. Id. at 848-49.
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identity. 76 Also, information privacy is central to Professor Warner's
Article for many reasons, such as the fact that information is the key
77
to market efficiency.
Professor Warner highlights two theories for achieving a balance
between privacy and market efficiency. 7 8 First, there is top-down regulation in which control is consolidated with the government. Second,
there is bottom-up regulation in which control is disseminated among
market participants. Allowing individuals to exchange their information, but only after businesses have obtained their consent, is a form
Warner believes to be more
of bottom-up regulation, which Professor
79
regulation.
efficient than top-down
The consent requirement is central to Professor Warner's analysis.
80
He asserts that it balances privacy and market efficiency, and he further contends that it may help nullify the threats that technology poses
to privacy.8 ' However, Professor Warner does recognize the limits to
the consent requirement, especially when data aggregation is involved. 82 Professor Warner is correct to observe that a consumer's
consent may control who initially receives their data, but the con83
sumer wholly fails to control who else obtains that information, and
76. Id. at 848.
77. Id. at 849-50.
78. Id. at 852-53.
79. Id. at 853-54, 861. Allowing consumers to trade or sell their data is a proposition that is
not free from controversy. One argument posits that relying on the market will reduce privacy
and that any benefits will only accrue to those who can either afford increased privacy protections or are in positions in which they do not have to offer their personal information to the
market. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2087 (2004). Another argument is that privacy thwarts market efficiency due to its potential for
shielding misrepresentations. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393
(1978).
80. Warner, supra note 74, at 863.
81. Id. at 868.
82. Id. at 869.
83. See Schwartz, supra note 79, at 2090-91 ("Free alienability thus prohibits an individual
from limiting another party in the use or transfer of data. In other words, an individual cannot
restrict those property interests that he signs away."). Another description of the marketplace
dynamic depicts a pronounced power imbalance that largely results from consumers' ignorance
about the information trade and the lack of incentives to induce businesses to create more secure
and effective privacy policies:
Empirical studies seem to confirm that sellers have disproportionate market power
when consumers possess imperfect information. In such circumstances, sellers cannot
be expected to compete on the basis of how much security they provide for information; instead, sellers can be expected to exploit consumer ignorance. To put it more
bluntly, consumers cannot protect their personal information when they are unaware of
how it is being used by others.
Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1074 (1999).
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perhaps more importantly, how that data is stored and combined with
other data. Data aggregation will lead to consumer profiles, which
inevitably will promote inaccurate summations of an individual's existence. 84 Those profiles also impact privacy in that they are based on
decontextualized and incomplete judgments of who we are. 85 Profiles
based on more personal, non-marketplace oriented data are potentially more destructive than profiles based on our consumer habits.8 6
Further, profiles based on data aggregation and mass data surveillance
are inconsistent with our notions of a free society.8 7 Professor Warner
discusses how we define ourselves by choosing the social roles that we
assume.8 8 Profiles created by data aggregation impede that process,
as they not only define the roles in terms of consumption (i.e., based
on a consumer's preferences in the marketplace), but also they prevent the individual from choosing what role to assume. 8 9 But data
84. Arbitrary assemblage of personal data long has been a chief concern to those supporters
of privacy rights. See Bloustein, supra note 1, at 1006 ("And the fear that a private life may be
turned into a public spectacle is greatly enhanced when the lurid facts have been reduced to key
punches or blips on a magnetic tape accessible, perhaps, to an clerk who can throw the appropriate switch.").
85. See ROSEN, supra note 36, at 115 (commenting that privacy "protects us from being objectified and simplified and judged out of context in a world of short attentions spans, a world in
which part of our identity can be mistaken for the whole of our identity").
86. Tribe, supra note 27, at 1896. Professor Tribe argues:
The outlawed acts-visualized in ways that obscure their similarity to what most sexually active adults themselves routinely do-come to represent human identities, and
this reductionist conflation of ostracized identity with outlawed act in turn reinforces
the vicious cycle of distancing and stigma that preserves the equilibrium of oppression
in one of the several distinct dynamics at play in the legal construction of social
hierarchy.
Id.
87. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 61 (2004) ("One ideal of America insists that your opportunities shouldn't be
limited by your profile in a database, that no doors should be permanently closed to anyone who
has the wrong smart card.").
88. Warner, supra note 74, at 855-56.
89. That is unless "choice" (in the context of choosing what social role to assume and thus
who we are) is defined solely in terms of marketplace behavior, which is not an option for those
of us who believe we are more than the sum of our credit card bills and grocery store receipts.
Over fifteen years ago, when data collection and aggregation was much less ubiquitous than it is
today, one author observed:
Inhibition, however, tends to be the rule once automated processing of personal data
becomes a normal tool of both government and private enterprises ....
Habits, activities, and preferences are compiled, registered, and retrieved to facilitate better adjustment, not to improve the individual's capacity to act and to decide. Whatever the
original incentive for computerization may have been, processing increasingly appears
as the ideal means to adapt an individual to a predetermined, standardized behavior
that aims at the highest possible degree of compliance with the model patient, consumer, taxpayer, employee, or citizen.
Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 733 (1987).
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aggregation expeditiously achieves market efficiency by greatly reducing the time and resources necessary for marketing. Thus, unregulated data aggregation will value market efficiency over privacy and
prevent a balance from existing between the two.
Professor Warner suggests that top-down regulation may be appropriate with respect to data aggregation. 90 But there are other possible
solutions to this problem, most notably Professor Schwartz's "hybrid
inalienability" model that "follows personal information through
downstream transfers and limits the negative effects that result from
'one-shot' permission to all personal data trade." 91 Due to the
92
skyrocketing value of our personal information and the increasing
ease with which that information is collected, it is imperative that we
develop and institute models to protect that information, especially
because it is connected so integrally to our individual identities.
As should be apparent, the authors' issues in this Symposium cover
a wide range of territory and topics in their explorations of how privacy impacts identity. But that is to be expected since issues of privacy and identity must be understood from multiple perspectives and
a plurality of views. Those issues do not lend themselves to singular,
or even binary definitions. However, the Articles do share many common themes: One of which is the notion that privacy is power. No
single Article mentions this explicitly, but it is implicit in all of them.
For Professor Hermann, privacy involves the power to engage in consensual, intimate, homosexual behavior with another adult. For Professor Samar, privacy leads to the power of equality. For Professor
Strahilevitz, privacy is the power to engage in conduct that does not
create external harms, even if others deem that conduct morally offensive. For Professor McClain, privacy leads to the power to form one's
own identity without succumbing to cultural and societal norms and
expectations. For Professor Kahn, privacy involves the power that individuals have to control their identities, rather than having the state
dictate those identities for them. For Professor Slobogin, privacy represents the power to require the government to abide by constitutional principles prior to obtaining our personal papers. For Lee Tien,
the essential issue is that we must have the power to protect our privacy. And for Professor Warner, the issue is that we must have the
power to protect our information in light of technological threats in90. Warner, supra note 74, at 871.
91. Schwartz, supra note 79, at 2094.
92. Id. at 2056 ("Personal information is an important currency in the new millennium. The
monetary value of personal data is large and still growing, and corporate America is moving
quickly to profit from this trend.").
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herent in a market economy. Ultimately, privacy is more than "the
'right to be let alone."' 93 It is the power to be free from invasive intrusions, 94 and in that state to define our identities and decide what
roles, rights, and responsibilities we will assume in society. 95 For us,
privacy involves the power to be free.

93. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890)
(quoting COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
94. Professor Bloustein explains:
The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality as including
the right to be free from certain types of intrusions. This measure of personal isolation
and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of
personal freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means by these concepts.
Bloustein, supra note 1, at 973; see also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1424 (2000) ("Autonomy in a contingent world
requires a zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and interference-a field of operation within which to engage in the conscious construction of self.").
95. Rosen argues:
Privacy is necessary ...to protect important social relationships-to make it possible
for people to interact as citizens in the public square, as professionals in the workplace,
and as friends, lovers, and family members in intimate group settings. But there is also
an important case for privacy that has to do with the development of human
individuality.
ROSEN, supra note 36, at 216.

